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The literature on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) determinants is remarkably diverse in terms of 
competing theories and empirical results. We utilize Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to resolve the 
model uncertainty that surrounds the validity of the competing FDI theories. Since the structure of existing 
FDI data is well known to induce selection bias, we extend BMA theory to HeckitBMA in order to address 
model uncertainty in the presence of selection bias. We show that more than half of the previously 
suggested FDI determinants are not robust and highlight theories that do receive robust support from the 
data.  Our selection approach allows us to identify the determinants of the margins of FDI (intensive and 
extensive), which are shown to differ profoundly. Our results suggest a new emphasis in FDI theories that 
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1. Introduction 
Global FDI flows increased tenfold, or by about $2 trillion, from 1990 to 2008 
(UNCTAD, 2009), nevertheless a consensus on robust FDI determinants is still elusive. 
Although remarkably diverse FDI theories have motivated a range of potential FDI 
determinants, empirical FDI approaches commonly juxtapose only limited subsets of 
candidate regressors.
1 In light of this model uncertainty, it comes as no surprise that FDI 
coefficient estimates are well known to be ambiguous and, at times, contradictory. The 
most comprehensive FDI survey to date (Blonigen, 2005) summarizes the FDI model 
uncertainty succinctly: “in the final analysis, the empirical literature on determinants of 
FDI is still young enough that most hypotheses are still up for grabs.” 
  Using Extreme Bound Analysis, Chakrabarti (2001) provided the first systematic 
evidence of the fragility of FDI determinants.
2  The ad hoc Extreme Bound approach has 
since been superseded by statistical theory, which developed Bayesian Model Averaging 
(BMA) to account for model uncertainty as part of the estimation procedure (Raftery, 
1995). The BMA approach is important since Berger and Sellke (1987) have shown that 
conventional sensitivity analyses overstate significance and confidence intervals in the 
absence of a full account of model uncertainty. When model uncertainty is not addressed 
comprehensively, it remains unclear whether a statistically significant FDI determinant 
remains relevant when alternative specifications/theories are considered. BMA 
methodology is thus tailor-made to examine the large set of candidate regressors that 
have been proposed as FDI determinants by alternative FDI theories.  
An added complication in FDI empirics is that even the most comprehensive FDI 
datasets contain large sections of missing data. Selection bias may thus contaminate 
coefficient estimates, since it is unclear whether the nature of FDI forces the lion’s share 
of investment to occur among OECD countries, or whether this observed FDI pattern is 
                                                 
1 For example, Blonigen and Piger (2011) note that three key empirical FDI studies include no fewer than 
22 different FDI determinants, but with little overlap. Baltagi et al. (2007) include a table that juxtaposes 4 
alternative FDI theories that motivate 15 different FDI determinants.  
2 Leamer (1978) suggested Extreme Bound Analysis as an ad hoc sensitivity analysis in the presence of 
model uncertainty. EBA has been criticized for its lack of statistical foundations; it also restricted 
Chakrabarti (2001) to a limited number of models.   2
an artifact of systematically missing observations.
3 To address both model uncertainty 
and selection bias, we introduce HeckitBMA, which extends the statistical foundations of 
BMA to include Heckman’s (1979) selection bias procedure.  
HeckitBMA reveals not only the determinants of the intensive and extensive 
margins of FDI (“the volume of investment flows” and “the decision to invest”, 
respectively), it also permits us to estimate FDI determinants without having to constrain 
parameter estimates to be identical across both margins. There is no reason to suspect that 
the margins of FDI should feature identical determinants, nor that the same determinant 
has the identical impact for both margins. Our selection criterion is based on Razin, 
Rubinstein and Sadka (2004), who note that FDI involves fixed costs that give rise to 
two-part decisions: a marginal productivity condition that determines how much to invest, 
and a total profitability condition that indicates whether or not to invest abroad. Previous 
studies have confirmed the relevance of such FDI fixed costs.
4   
Our results show that the impact of model uncertainty on FDI estimates is 
substantial and that the Heckman selection methodology is necessary to obtain unbiased 
and consistent estimates. In the absence of explicit controls for model uncertainty, the 
conventional Heckit procedure suggests nearly three times as many FDI determinants as 
HeckitBMA at the extensive margin (32 vs 13) and a 50% more regressors at the 
intensive margin. This is not surprising, since Heckit is not designed to consider models 
associated with alternative theories. Instead, HeckitBMA discovers much more 
parsimonious models of FDI that score better as measured by the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC).  
Robust FDI determinants that increase the intensive margin of FDI pertain not 
only to the host and source, but also to bilateral characteristics such as common 
history/language, as well as share PTA membership (APEC, LAIA) or a currency union 
(Dollar). Country characteristics that increase the volume of FDI flows include the host’s 
lack of corruption, ethnic tension and bureaucratic red tape, as well as the source 
                                                 
3 This FDI data issue has been well documented as early as Soto (2000). OECD data covers FDI activity 
among OECD countries comprehensively, but OECD/Non-OECD coverage is spotty and Non-OECD 
country-pairs are nonexistent. 
4 Caballero and Engel (1999), Razin, Rubenstein, and Sadka (2004), Razin and Sadka (2006).     3
country’s lack of internal conflict, corruption and ethnic tension. Economic 
characteristics that increase bilateral FDI flows include larger market size and lower 
taxes (in both source and host), as well as the host’s productivity and GDP growth and 
the source country’s level of development and investment profile. We highlight that these 
results are robust across subsamples, but that the OECD samples have a slightly different 
set of FDI determinants. 
In stark contrast, the decision to invest is affected by markedly fewer 
determinants. Country characteristics that affect the extensive margin are common 
colonial history/borders, as well as the lack of religious tension in the host and lower 
corruption in source countries. Economic factors that increase the likelihood of FDI 
investment include host and source country market size, as well as the host’s market 
potential and level of development. Greater source country productivity, taxation, or 
economic tensions decrease the likelihood that FDI is undertaken. 
The importance of these FDI determinants is best appreciated once we relate the 
individual regressors back to specific FDI theories. We find only mixed support for 
horizontal or export platform FDI theories (Markusen, 1984). Trade agreements and 
currency unions do not encourage FDI across the board but only in specific instances 
(e.g., dollarization and APEC membership). Market potential exerts a decisive effect on 
FDI, but as in Blonigen et al. (2007), we find the effect runs counter to the theory 
prediction: a host’s proximity to large markets results in less FDI – as large, proximate 
markets  divert FDI from smaller potential hosts. Vertical FDI incentives (Helpman, 
1984) are not strongly supported as we find that FDI is sensitive to higher levels of 
development or development differentials. Contrary to the knowledge-capital model 
(Markusen et al., 1996 and Markusen, 1997), we find no evidence that educational 
differences exert robust effects on the margins of FDI. HeckitBMA does confirm the 
Razin et al. (2007a) hypothesis that productivity is a crucial determinant of the decision 
to invest, together with corporate taxes in source and host countries. Bilateral tax treaties, 
in contrast, are shown to exert no impact on FDI, supporting the view that such treaties 
are created not only to facilitate investment, but also to restrict tax evasion and transfer 
pricing (the latter reduce FDI incentives).   4
Closely related to our paper is the body of work of Razin and Sadka (2007b), who 
separate the decision to invest from the quantity of FDI flows. Their pioneering empirical 
work also consistently documents evidence for selection bias in FDI regressions.
5 We 
expand their approach to include the large number of regressors that have been suggested 
by alternative FDI theories. Methodologically, our approach is related to Chakrabarti’s 
(2001) Extreme Bound Analysis and to Blonigen and Piger (2011) who use Bayesian 
methods to analyze model uncertainty surrounding FDI stocks in a cross section. In 
contrast, we examine the dynamics of FDI flows from 1988-2000 and control for 
selection bias.  
2. Empirical  Methodology 
Bergstrand and Egger (2007) provide theoretical foundations that motivate the use of 
gravity equations to analyze FDI patterns. The gravity equation has become the most 
popular approach in examining FDI determinants (see Barba Vanaretti and Venables, 
2004), suggesting that FDI flows can be modeled according to  
ijt ijt ij jt it t ijt X D GDP GDP Y               4 3 2 1 0 log log log ,   (1) 
where the log of bilateral FDI at time t, Yijt, depends positively on the market size of host, 
j, and source, i, countries, GDPjt, and GDPit, as well as on their bilateral distance, Dij. 
Typically a matrix of covariates, Xijt, is included to represent alternative FDI theories. 
These regressors are motivated at length in Section 4 below. The inclusion of time fixed 
effects,  t  , is standard to eliminate bias resulting from aggregate global shocks. Time 
fixed effects also mitigate possible spurious correlation that could be introduced, for 
example, by the use of the U.S. CPI to deflate FDI flows.  












                                                 
5 FDI selection bias is also prominent in Davies and Kristjansdottir (2010), and Balsvik and Haller (2011). 
6 Whenever possible, we suppress subscripts to simplify notation.    5
where Y is the dependent variable, X is a set of covariates, and Z is an unobserved factor 
that dictates whether Y is observed.  Z is determined by a set of variables W, where X and 
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 (3) 
The classical selection bias arises when 
2 0    , which causes the OLS estimates of   
that use only the observed values of Y  to be biased. 
Heckman (1979) proposes a method to correct this bias.  His Heckit model first 
performs a probit regression on Z, which is equal to 1 if Y is observed and 0 otherwise, 
using W as covariates and yielding vector estimates,   .  Once    is found,  W Z ' ˆ ~
   is 
formed to obtain the Inverse Mills Ratio,      Z Z
~ ~ ˆ    , which is the ratio of the 
probability density function over the cumulative distribution function of Z
~
. In a second 
stage, those Y that are observed are regressed on X and the Inverse Mills Ratio,   , 
yielding the consistent vector estimates,  ˆ . The Inverse Mills Ratio (sometimes called 
“selection hazard”) is a function that is motivated by the properties of truncated normal 
distributions to control for selection bias. When the null hypothesis that the coefficient on 
the Inverse Mills Ratio is zero is rejected, selection bias is present and OLS estimates are 
downward biased. 
HeckitBMA combines Heckit and BMA methodologies.  Just like the Heckit 
methodology, HeckitBMA processes the data as a two stage estimator, but it also 
addresses model uncertainty in both stages.  The first stage is an application of BMA for 
logistic regression based on Viallefont, Raftery and Richardson (2001) to form model 
averaged estimates of Z and  .  Below we introduce the two HeckitBMA stages in detail. 
As we introduce HeckitBMA notation, it is helpful to review BMA properties that 
are implied in stage 1. Let         
p
i i iW Z
1 , where  p W W W ,..., , 2 1  i s  a  s u b s e t  o f  
n W W W ,..., , 2 1 .
7 The set of potential models is comprised of the individual models 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive BMA survey, see Raftery (1995) for detailed discussions and derivations.   6
 S M M ,..., 1 .  BMA stipulates that the posterior distribution of   given the data, D, is 
given by the weighted average of the predictive distribution under each model. The 
specific weights are derived from the models’ corresponding posterior probabilities,  
     
I
M n s s n n
s D M pr D pr    , | |      (4) 
where   D M pr s n , |   is the predictive distribution given model  s M , and   D M pr s s |    
is the model’s prior probability. The posterior model probability for each first stage 
model is  
       s s s s M pr M D pr D M pr | |    , where  (5) 
        s s s s s s d M pr M D pr M D pr    | , | |  (6) 
is the integrated likelihood of model Ms with parameters  s  .  The prior densities for 
parameters and models are   s s M pr |   and    s M pr , respectively.
8 
  Posterior model probabilities are also the weights used to establish the posterior 






ˆ ˆ         (7) 
       
2
1
2 | , | ˆ D E M D Var s s
S
s s s s
BMA             (8) 
  The posterior distribution for a parameter is a mixture of a regular posterior 
distribution and a point mass at zero, which represents the probability that the parameter 
equals zero.  The sum of the posterior probabilities of the models that contain a variable 
yields its inclusion probability, which is taken as a measure of the importance of that 
variable.  For instance, for variable  k W  we may write, 
                                                 
8 We follow the literature with the standard assumption of uniform model priors (so that, ex ante, each 
model is presumed equally likely). Our parameter prior is the Unit Information Prior (see Raftery, 1995). 
This prior has been criticized as too conservative (e.g., returning too few effective regressors), but Eicher, 
Papageorgiou and Raftery (2011) show that in economic applications the prior density is sufficiently spread 
out to be reasonably flat over the region of the parameter space where the likelihood is substantial. 
Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001) propose an alternative prior, which is also popular in economic 
applications. It is, however, significantly more conservative and can have lower predictive performance.    7
         
k k k M s s W W
BMA D pr     | 0 ˆ  (9) 
where Mk is a collection of indices for which  k M s  implies model Ms does not restrict 
the parameter  k   to zero.  The general rule developed by Jeffreys (1961) and refined by 
Kass and Raftery (1995) stipulates effect-thresholds for posterior probability. Posterior 
probabilities < 50% are seen as evidence against an effect, and the evidence for an effect 
is either weak, positive, strong, or decisive for posterior probabilities ranging from 50-
75%, 75-95%, 95-99%, and > 99%, respectively. In our analysis, we refer to a regressor 
as “effective,” if its posterior inclusion probability exceeds 50%. 
2.1.  Selection Bias and HeckitBMA 
  While BMA has previously been applied in the context of international 
economics,
9 our specific FDI application requires an extension of the canonical BMA 
theory to account for selection bias. When the structure of the data suggests the potential 
of selection bias, the BMA framework in the previous section can be extended to a two-
step Heckit model averaging procedure in which estimation is performed.  HeckitBMA 
documents whether the absence of observed FDI flows is the result of randomly missing 
observations or due to endogenous FDI selection decisions that introduce bias to OLS 
coefficient estimates in previous FDI studies.  
  HeckitBMA is a nested BMA approach that establishes the posterior model 
probabilities in the first stage according to the BMA methodology, determining both  s   
and  s Z
~
, as well as the first stage fitted values for each model Ms.  The methodology then 







1      (10) 
                                                 
9 See e.g., Eicher, Henn, and Papageorgiou (2008) and Blonigen and Piger (2011). Other BMA applications 
in economics include investigations of growth determinants such as Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001) and 
Eicher, Papageorgiou and Raftery (2011), Iterative BMA in Eicher, Papageorgiou and Roehn (2007) and 
2SLSBMA in Eicher, Lenkoski, and Raftery (2009). 
10 An alternative Bayesian approach to sample selection models involves the imputation of the censored 
observations (see e.g. Chapter 14 of Koop et al.).  On paper, such an approach is appealing, since the 
posterior distribution can be approximated through the seemingly straightforward application of a Gibbs 
sampler.  However, in practice the requirement that such a large number of missing values be imputed at 
each step of the sampler may lead to considerable autocorrelation in the Markov Chain (see Omori 2007), 
thereby causing convergence to be extremely slow, if not practically impossible.    8
and derives from this the Inverse Mills Ratio,     
BMA BMA BMA Z Z
~ ~ ˆ    .  
The second-stage model selection procedure is follows the classical linear 
regression BMA, as outlined in Hoeting et al. (1997), with the model-averaged inverse 
mill's ratio added as an additional variable in each specification.  In terms of the priors on 
the models/parameters we use the Unit Information Prior (UIP), which facilitates the BIC 
approximation, as outlined in Raftery (1995). Denoting by    N L L L ,..., 1   the set of 
second stage models, HeckitBMA uses 
BMA  ˆ  and the data, D, to derive the second stage 
posterior model probabilities,    D L pr n n |   , and estimates,  n  ˆ , for each model 
L Ln  .
11  The HeckitBMA posterior mean and variance are then given by 
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HeckitBMA D E L D Var                     (12) 
Equation (10) shows that the HeckitBMA estimate is formed as the average of each 
estimate that results from using the combination of 
BMA  ˆ  and model Ln in the second 
stage, weighted by the second stage probabilities. As in traditional BMA, we can 
calculate the inclusion probabilities as  
        
k k k L n j X X
HeckitBMA D pr     | 0 ˆ    (13) 
The HeckitBMA inclusion probability carries the same interpretation as in the 
conventional BMA methodology. The only difference is that the inclusion probability is 
now based on estimates and model probabilities that account for selection bias.
12  
 
                                                 
11 Note this implies that the inverse Mills ratio, 
BMA  ˆ , is not subject to model selection, hence we cannot use 
its inclusion probability as an indicator for the existence of selection bias. Instead the Mills ratio’s Bayesian 
Credible Interval is used. 
12 To search the model space effectively, we used the Mode Oriented Stochastic Search (MOSS) algorithm 
developed by Lenkoski and Dobra (2011) and ran it from different starting points to ensure consistent 
results.  The MOSS algorithm is a variant of the Shotgun Stochastic Search (SSS) algorithm (see Hans, et 
al., 2007) and has been shown to produce better or equal results as MC3 (Raftery et al, 1997) or Leaps and 
Bounds (Furnival and Wilson, 1974) while being able to handle many more candidate regressors.  Our 
results would be unchanged had we used, for instance, SSS. MOSS essentially reproduces results in Eicher 
et al., 2011, which had been obtained using either MC3 or the Leaps and Bounds.    9
3.  FDI Theories and Model Uncertainty 
This section outlines the model uncertainty surrounding FDI determinants, which 
requires a brief survey of existing FDI theories. Early FDI theory suggested two distinct 
motivations for FDI: horizontal FDI, which is undertaken to access markets when firms 
encounter trade restrictions, and vertical FDI, which leverages low factor prices in host 
countries to reduce production costs (see, e.g., Markusen, 1984 and Helpman, 1984).  
Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (1997) unified these two FDI motivations in the 
knowledge-capital model of FDI. Due to its complexity, closed-form solutions of the 
knowledge-capital model are elusive and simulated results highlight nonlinearities.  
New trade theory provides for additional and more intricate FDI patterns.   
Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007) and Bergstrand and Egger (2007) suggest export 
platform FDI is undertaken to serve not only the host country, but also to produce goods 
that are subsequently exported to neighboring countries.  This strand of the literature 
highlights the importance of a comprehensive account of regional trade agreements in the 
empirical approach. Vertical interaction FDI is undertaken when subsidiaries in host 
countries ship intermediate goods back and forth for processing before exporting finished 
products back to the parent (see, e.g., Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2007).   
These theories have been taken to the data with mixed success in a variety of 
econometric approaches. Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) provide evidence in favor 
of horizontal and vertical FDI that is consistent with the knowledge-capital model. 
Bergstrand and Egger (2007) introduce a third mobile factor (physical capital) to the 
knowledge-capital model to highlight the interaction between trade agreements and FDI 
flows. They find substantial evidence for effects of RTAs on FDI flows, which vanish, 
however, when transport and investment costs are included. 
Yeaple (2003) utilizes affiliate sales to their parent companies to interact factor 
endowment differences with industry factor intensities. He reports positive evidence for 
both vertical and horizontal FDI motivations. Coughlin and Segev (2000) focus on export 
platform FDI by exploring possible regional/spatial FDI patterns to find evidence for 
export platform FDI and agglomeration externalities. Further support for export platform   10
FDI is provided by Blonigen et al. (2007), who estimate negative FDI effects associated 
with neighboring-country FDI, using US/EU data.  
Finally, Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2007) develop a general model of FDI 
in a multi-country world. It predicts how neighboring country characteristics (e.g., GDP, 
trade costs, endowments, etc.) affect FDI in a given host country, depending on the 
specific FDI motivation (horizontal, vertical, export-platform, etc.). They find mixed 
evidence and only weak support for export-platform and vertical interaction FDI.  
4.  Existing Empirical Approaches and Candidate Regressors 
The above set of FDI theories and their associated empirical approaches motivate a 
substantial set of candidate regressors that identify FDI determinants.
13 In this section we 
outline the set of regressors that have been associated with each of the above mentioned 
theories as well as the regressors that are commonly added to FDI gravity equations as 
additional controls (see Table 1 for a summary).  
Aside from the typical gravity variables specified in (1), generic regressors such 
as Language, Border, and Colonial History are usually added to capture country-pair 
specific effects that might induce/obstruct FDI. In addition, the Real Exchange Rate is 
included in the gravity model as depreciations in the host country are thought to increase 
both the intensive and extensive margins of FDI (Goldberg and Klein, 1998). 
Depreciations reduce the amount of foreign currency needed to purchase assets abroad, 
and reduce the nominal return to the source in terms of foreign currency. Hence the often 
insignificant real exchange rate coefficient should not be surprising in large panel FDI 
studies.  
Factor endowments are another key determinant of FDI. GDP Per Capita is 
commonly included to proxy for FDI that leverages differences in incomes, development, 
or capital abundance. As a measure of country income level, per capita GDP is expected 
                                                 
13 Note that a number of these determinants, such as real per capita GDP, GDP growth rate, productivity, 
exchange rate, may well be suspected to be endogenous (see e.g, Russ, 2007 and Bergstrand and Egger, 
2007) . Also trade and trade agreements may well be endogenous (see e.g, Blonigen 2010 or Aizenman and 
Noy (2004, 2005). Previous approaches to resolving endogeneity and model uncertainty include 
Tsangarides (2004), Chen, Mirestean, and Tsangarides (2009), Mirestean and Tsangarides (2009), as well 
as Moral-Benito (2009). We leave the thorny issue of developing a statistical theory of both endogeneity 
and selection bias to future research.    11
to increase FDI flows for both source and host countries.  As a measure of capital 
abundance, per capita GDP is predicted to generate positive FDI outflows for source 
countries and negative flows for host countries, since basic FDI models imply flows from 
capital-abundant to labor-abundant countries (Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004). Education 
differences among country pairs are a proxy for vertical FDI motivations.   According to 
the knowledge-capital model, greater educational disparities are expected to promote 
larger vertical FDI outflows.  
Prospective growth, proxied by GDP Growth, signals higher returns, which attract 
FDI to a host and reduce outflows from a source country (see Rodrick, 1999 and Lim, 
2001). Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen, (2007), Blonigen et al. (2007), and Baltagi, Egger 
and Pfaffermayr (2007) also include Market Potential (the size of proximate third country 
markets)  to indicate each country’s attraction as an export platform. Great market 
potential signals that the country should receive more export platform FDI as the host can 
serve relatively large markets in its relative proximity. However, the coefficient of this 
regressor has seldom been reported to be of the right sign, given large and important 
outliers such as Japan. A third economic factor that is seen to exert crucial influence on 
FDI returns is Country Productivity (Razin, Rubenstein, and Sadka 2004, and Razin, 
Sadka, and Tong, 2008). Razin, Sadka, and Tong (2008) develop a theory where 
productivity increases affect FDI setup costs such that an increase in host productivity 
reduces the likelihood of new FDI, but increases FDI outflows to existing subsidiaries.  
Blonigen (2005) highlights how Corporate Tax Rates and Tax Treaties influence 
FDI flows while Razin and Sadka (2007b, Ch 10) point out the differential impact of 
source/host tax rates. Host taxes reduce FDI primarily at the intensive margin and source 
tax rates increase FDI outflow primarily at the extensive margin. Increases in source 
countries’ corporate taxes induce multinationals to establish new affiliates abroad, but the 
quantity of production transferred abroad increases when host countries’ tax rates decline. 
Although the number of bilateral tax treaties has increased from 100 to over 2,500 since 
1960 (Egger et al., 2006), the empirical evidence regarding their effects is ambiguous 
(see Davies, 2004 for a survey). Studies often do not differentiate between the intensive 
and extensive margins; when the margins of FDI are considered, as in Blonigen and 
Davies (2004) results show strong positive effects of existing tax treaties on FDI, but   12
negative effects of new tax treaties (see also Egger et al., 2006). When Di Giovanni 
(2005) examines only the extensive margin of FDI, positive effects of tax treaties are 
reported.
14  
Financial risk also serves as a central determinant of FDI. Razin, Sadka, and Tong 
(2008) include crucial risk measures in their econometric analysis. Economic and 
Political Risk have also featured prominently in recent growth regressions; variables that 
proxy for such risks are included in regressions to capture factors that impact the return 
on investment. Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) first included variables that relate to 
economic and political risk, such as the risk of expropriation. It is usually thought that 
less risk increases inflows to a host and reduces outflows from a source country.  
We also include measures of regional trade agreements and currency unions. 
There is considerable evidence that currency unions affect FDI, although much of the 
research has focused on Europe only (see e.g., Petroulas, 2007 and Baldwin et al., 2008). 
Trade and FDI are well known to be closely related, and Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 
(2009) find that roughly 50 percent of U.S. trade is intra-firm trade between affiliates of 
the same MNC. Here the thorny issue is endogeneity; hence we focus on the effects of 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), which have a clear but not necessarily direct impact 
on FDI via export platform and/or horizontal/vertical FDI incentives.
15 The ambiguity 
arises as RTAs might increase FDI to an export platform within the RTA, and reduce it to 
all other members of the RTA. In addition, RTAs alter firms’ tariff-jumping FDI 
incentives to amplify export platform FDI effects (Blonigen, 2002). To separate trade 
effects that arise within and between RTAs, Eicher, Henn, and Papageorgiou (2008) 
highlight the importance of controlling for all possible individual RTAs rather than 
including just one average catch-all RTA effect. 
                                                 
14 The design of tax treaties may also contribute to the ambiguous findings. While treaties reduce 
withholding taxes and double taxation; Radaelli (1997) and Gravelle (1988) assert that reducing tax evasion 
is the primary goal of U.S. tax treaties via reduced transfer pricing and Hines (1996) shows that the way in 
which source countries eliminate double taxation can have different implications for FDI activity. 
15 The Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), the Dollar Currency Unions (DOLLAR), the European 
Economic Area (EEA), the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the EU, the Eurozone (Euro), the Latin 
American Integration Agreement (LAIA), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have 
sufficient observations to be included.    13
Given the diversity of theories, the common approach has been to focus on 
specific effects, such as tax treaties, or particular RTAs. Since we are proposing to 
juxtapose alternative theories, we seek to include representative regressors that 
encompass as many of the previous approaches as possible. The number of previous 
approaches is only superseded by the remarkable diversity of the associated results. Table 
1 summarizes the diversity of positive and negative effects that have be obtained for the 
same regressors in FDI studies; it highlights not only model uncertainty, but also the 
fragility of the results when model uncertainty is not accounted for as part of the 
statistical methodology. If different approaches focus only on particular subsets of the 
FDI model space, it is no surprise that the associated results generate potentially different 
conclusions for the same regressor. The purpose of HeckitBMA is to resolve this model 
uncertainty, which requires this comprehensive set of regressors.   
5. Data 
Our dataset is based on Razin, Sadka, and Tong (2008), which includes data on 
productivity, GDP per capita, skill differences, common language, distance, population, 
and host and source country financial risk.
16  Their FDI outflow data was obtained from 
the OECD International Direct Investment Database (OECD) and deflated by the U.S. 
CPI. We augment the Razin et al. (2008) dataset to allow tests of the alternative theories 
outlined above. The additional data collected includes additional controls for tax rates, 
tax treaties, trade agreements, currency unions, institutions, market potential, market size, 
and exchange rate agreements.  
  Average effective corporate tax rates are calculated using the definition and 
information in Altshuler et al. (1998), Blonigen and Davies (2004), and U.S. Treasury 
Corporate Tax Files. A list of bilateral tax treaties was obtained from Neumeyer and 
Spess (2005). Trade Agreements (multilateral and bilateral), as well as currency union 
indicators were obtained from Eicher and Henn (2011). Market potential is constructed 
according to the definition provided in Blonigen et al. (2007). 
                                                 
16 Financial risk is an index of five components: foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign debt service 
as a percentage of exports of goods and services, current account as a percentage of exports of goods and 
services, net international liquidity as months of import cover, and exchange rate stability.     14
For institutional variables we include country risk proxies that are obtained from 
International Country Risk Guides (ICRG 1985-2000), which also provides the exact 
variable definitions. Information on economic risk covers the host and source country’s 
Corruption, Bureaucratic Efficiency, and Investment Profile.
17 Political risk is proxied by 
Democratic Accountability, Ethnic Tension, Internal/External Conflict, Government 
Stability, Political Violence, Rule of Law, Military Government Participation, Religious 
Tensions, and a Socio-Economic profile (which includes unemployment, consumer 
confidence, and poverty measures).
18 Our unbalanced panel finally covers years 1988-
2000 and includes 46 countries (21 non-OECD), 803 unique country pairs with 14863 
total observations, of which 64 percent indicate zero FDI flows.  There are small 
differences between the 55 regressors in our study compared to the 56 regressors in 
Blonigen and Piger’s (2011) cross section. These differences relate to the differences in 
time dimensions in the studies. Sources and summary statistics are provided in Table 2 
and the frequencies of FDI host/source flows are provided in Table 3. 
6.  FDI Determinants and Model Uncertainty 
To establish a benchmark, we commence with a set of diagnostics comparing OLS to 
BMA results, abstracting from the issue of selection bias. Table 4 shows that the OLS 
regression suggests a surprisingly large number of 34 statistically significant FDI 
determinants. In contrast, BMA produces a much more parsimonious set of 23 regressors 
based on models that are associated with lower BICs than OLS. The BMA results also 
allow somewhat of a comparison to Blonigen and Piger (2011), who also examine model 
uncertainty and FDI determinants, but who do not address selection bias. Here a 
cautionary note is in order, however, since Blonigen and Piger examine FDI stocks in one 
cross section (2000) while we examine the dynamics of FDI flows in a panel of over a 
dozen years, which renders a comparison to be difficult.  
Comparing our preliminary diagnostic BMA results, which do not account for 
sample selection bias, with the results obtained from the same empirical methodology 
employed by Blonigen and Piger (2011), we find similar effects for regressors related to 
                                                 
17 Investment profile measures government attitude toward inward investment as determined by (i) risk to 
operations, (ii) taxation, (iii) repatriation, and (iv) labor costs. 
18 ICRG variables are coded such that higher values reflect less risk.    15
gravity, and similarities/differences in host/source income levels (capital per capita, 
education difference, skill levels, real GDP, GDP differences). Those BMA results that 
take advantage of the time/dynamic dimension of FDI highlight the differential effects of 
(a) taxation and productivity, (b) regional trade agreements (APEC), currency unions 
(dollar), and (c) non-economic country characteristics (common heritage 
language/history, corruption, internal conflict, religious tensions).  
6.1  FDI Determinants, Model Uncertainty and Selection Bias 
  Our central object of interest is, however, to control for selection bias and model 
uncertainty simultaneously, since a large fraction of the data is either randomly or 
systematically missing.
19 Tables 4 and 5 report both Heckit and HeckitBMA results to 
contrast the impact of model uncertainty on the number and types of FDI determinants at 
the intensive (extensive) FDI margins.
20 The Tables document the importance of model 
uncertainty in the analysis of FDI determinants: Heckit suggests no fewer than 35 (32) 
FDI determinants at the intensive (extensive) margins, which is dramatically higher than 
the 23 (13) regressors suggested by HeckitBMA.  
  The substantially greater number of regressors suggested by Heckit indicates the 
importance of model uncertainty in FDI regressions. Heckit simply reports statistical 
significance associated with various FDI theories without accounting for the uncertainty 
whether the true theory is being examined. Accounting for this model uncertainty 
HeckitBMA results in Table 5 suggest that alternative models, which are much more 
parsimonious, receive far greater support from the data. This is confirmed by the 
difference between the joint likelihoods of the Heckit and the best models in HeckitBMA. 
The likelihood-ratio test, which does not penalize for the included number of regressors, 
easily rejects the Heckit model in favor of HeckitBMA’s model that received the greatest 
                                                 
19  Strictly speaking the absence of FDI flows between country pairs may be due to (a) the lack of 
incentives for flows (even if there were no fixed costs), (b) setup costs that do not allow flows to take place, 
and (c) measurement errors. An alternative approach would be to simply include all zeros and ignore the 
selection equation. To implement the approach we would have to follow Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) and 
add a “1” to all observations, so that the dependent variable becomes ln[flow + 1], since ln[0] is not 
defined. The approach has been discussed extensively in Frankel (1996) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) and rejected as it leads to inconsistent estimates whose biases depend on the approach and dataset.  
20 As in Razin, Rubenstein, and Sadka (2004) we include a negative FDI lag, to account for negative FDI 
flows (e.g., the liquidation of foreign subsidiaries).   16
weight in the model averaging procedure. Similarly, the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC), which is used to compare the performance of nested model specifications, clearly 
favors HeckitBMA. Hence it is no surprise that Heckit overestimates significance levels 
to generate an excessively large number of FDI determinants. HeckitBMA provides not 
only fewer, but also different FDI determinants. It supports additional FDI determinants 
at both the intensive and extensive margins that were not significant in the Heckit 
methodology. The investment profile of the source country matters in for HeckitBMA 
flows but not for Heckit, while the EFTA PTA, the hosts financial risk and military 
involvement in government are shown to affect selection for HeckitBMA but not Heckit. 
We discuss the detailed results for the global sample and for an OECD subsample below. 
6.2.  Robust FDI Determinants in the Global Sample 
In this section we detail robust FDI determinants for the global sample. We first examine 
regressors that are associated with the decision to invest. This FDI margin is crucially 
important given the structure of the data where large segments of observations are either 
zero because FDI is not profitable, or because the data is systematically missing. Both 
Heckit and HeckitBMA show that the gravity approach is appropriate and that the 
Heckman selection methodology is necessary.  All gravity regressors exhibit high 
inclusion probabilities and correct magnitudes at both margins of FDI. In addition, we 
find that the Inverse Mills Ratio indicates decisive (or highly significant) evidence of 
selection bias in the HeckitBMA (or Heckit) procedures as reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
The exclusion restriction (Past_FDI_Dummy) suggested by Razin et al. (2008) is shown 
to exert a decisive effect on the decision to invest.
21 It is thus clear that a full account of 
firms’ decisions to invest in a selection (or participation) stage is critical to eliminating 
the omitted variables bias that contaminates parameter estimates in pure OLS 
approaches.
22  
                                                 
21 Razin et al. (2008) propose that FDI setup costs imply a profitability threshold so that past FDI relations 
can serve as an exclusion restriction. 
22 Greene (1981) shows that in the presence of selection bias, the OLS estimator is biased downward and 
the degree of the bias is related to the proportion of data censored. Since 64% of the data in the OECD FDI 
dataset is potentially censored the bias may be substantial. This may be one reason why Blonigen and 
Piger’s (2011) approach does not produce a substantial number of robust FDI determinants.   17
To simplify the discussion of the effects in Table 5, we group effective FDI 
determinants into two categories, “economic” and “country characteristics,” and consider 
extensive and intensive FDI determinants in sequence. For the extensive FDI margin, 
HeckitBMA suggests that country characteristics such as a common linguistic, military, 
religious and ethnic tensions in the host, as well as religious tensions in the source 
country affect the likelihood of FDI flows. Economic factors that exert a positive effect 
on the extensive margin of FDI include a host’s level of development, lower taxes and 
financial risk, while higher taxes and financial risk increase the likelihood of FDI 
outflows from a source country. Here it is important to note the importance of the 
inclusion of trade agreements, since both APEC and EFTA imply a great likelihood that 
FDI will be undertaken between member countries.  
Robust FDI determinants increase the intensive margin of FDI pertain not only to 
the host and source, but also to bilateral characteristics such as common history/language, 
as well as share PTA membership (APEC, LAIA) or a currency union (Dollar). Country 
characteristics that increase the volume of FDI flows include the host’s lack of 
corruption, ethnic tension and bureaucratic red tape, as well as the source country’s lack 
of internal conflict, corruption and ethnic tension. Economic characteristics that increase 
bilateral FDI flows include larger market size and lower taxes (in both source and host), 
as well as the host’s productivity and GDP growth and the source country’s level of 
development and investment profile. Interestingly, a host’s market potential reduces FDI 
flows, which is in line with previous empirical results, but at odds with the prominent 
export platform approach to FDI.  
The results are also insightful in terms of the absence of effects that are 
commonly reported in the literature. Neither tax treaties nor skill differences are shown to 
exert effects on FDI. These results confirm the findings of the previous literature that tax 
treaties may not only facilitate, but also impede FDI when treaties are also designed to 
reduce tax evasion and transfer pricing. Blonigen and Piger (2011) also do not find that 
skill differences drive knowledge-capital FDI motives. 
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6.3  Robust FDI Determinants Across OECD Countries 
Our previous results presuppose that a uniform set of FDI determinants governs 
FDI across all countries. There exists, however, ample evidence that subsamples of 
countries follow distinctly different development and FDI patterns. Masanjala and 
Papageorgiou (2008) highlight, for example, the differences in growth determinants for 
Africa, and Eicher et al. (2007) document differences in growth determinants for OECD 
countries, even after accounting for model uncertainty. In the context of FDI, Blonigen 
and Wang (2004) emphasize that data on FDI between countries are highly skewed, 
where the lion’s share of activity is observed among developed countries while there is 
little or no activity for smaller developing nations. One approach to addressing the 
potential heterogeneity in FDI determinants is to separate developed and developing 
countries in empirical FDI studies.  We proceed by running a simple diagnostic test (not 
reported here, but available from the authors) that adds a region dummy to our 
specification. While the core determinants results remain basically unchanged, the OECD 
dummy turns out to be an important determinant of FDI flows.  
With this evidence for potential parameter in hand, we proceed to split the sample 
and examine the determinants of FDI flows for OECD country-pairs only (A non-OECD 
subsample is not possible since there are no reported flows for non-OECD country pairs). 
The results regarding the FDI determinants in the two subsamples are largely identical, 
although they differ in a few instances in rather expected fashion. 
Among OECD country pairs, common language, EFTA, and military influence in 
governance are no longer relevant in the selection stage. This is not surprising, since there 
is hardly any variation in these variables across the OECD sample. Instead we find a 
number of additional selection criteria that determine the likelihood of FDI for OECD 
country pairs.  Lower ethnic tension and higher levels of development increase the 
likelihood that one OECD source country invests in another. Again the market size of the 
host has a negative impact on the likelihood of FDI investment, which greater 
productivity in the host country lowers the probability of investment. The latter is a 
confirmation of the Razin et al. (2007) FDI fixed costs theory   19
In terms of FDI flows among OECD countries, we find a similar pattern as in the 
selection equation, where a small set of regressors loose their effect while a sizable set of 
additional FDI determinants can be added. No longer relevant are the source’s level of 
internal conflict, or the market size and investment profile of the host. At the same time, 
HeckitBMA discovers that OECD country pairs exhibit additional FDI flow determinants 
that did not exert effects in the global sample. Military interference in politics, 
government instability, and internal conflict increase FDI outflows from OECD source 
countries, while lower financial risk, less increased bureaucratic efficiency, and fewer 
ethnic tensions increase FDI flows to host countries. Notable are, however, also key 
parameters in the regression are not affected by the sample split. Neither the gravity 
equation parameters, nor regressors related to any of the FDI theories discussed above 
(excluding the export platform approach), nor the exclusion restriction experience sizable 
changes in the magnitudes of their effects.  
7. Conclusion 
  FDI flows increased dramatically in the past 20 years. Over the same time period, 
the literature produced a dramatic proliferation of FDI theories as well as empirical FDI 
approaches. The uncertainty surrounding FDI theories and empirical approaches has 
created the notion that few FDI determinants are truly robust. Numerous empirical 
studies estimate only subsets of particular FDI theories to produce results that are often 
either inconclusive or outright contradictory. Statisticians refer to such diversity of 
theories and results as model uncertainty. When model uncertainty is not addressed 
comprehensively as part of the empirical strategy, traditional robustness analyses 
overstate significance levels and confidence intervals.  
We extend the FDI literature in two dimensions. First, we construct a large dataset 
that represents a comprehensive set of FDI determinants that have been proposed by 
previous theories. Second, since large shares of FDI data are systematically missing from 
even the most detailed FDI dataset, we introduce HeckitBMA, which extends Bayesian 
Model Averaging to resolve the model uncertainty in the presence of selection bias. Our 
approach allows us to separate and estimate the determinants of two separate aspects of   20
the FDI decision: a) the decision to invest abroad and b) how much to invest in a 
particular host country.  
Our results show that the impact of model uncertainty on FDI estimates is 
substantial and that the Heckman selection methodology is necessary. Without 
controlling for model uncertainty, the conventional Heckit procedure suggests nearly 
twice as many FDI determinants as HeckitBMA at the extensive margin and 12 
additional regressors (33%) at the intensive margin. This is not surprising, since Heckit 
does not consider the models associated with alternative theories. Instead we find that 
HeckitBMA assigns the greatest weight to more parsimonious models that score 
dramatically better in terms of joint likelihoods or Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). 
The determinants of the intensive and extensive margins of FDI are also shown to differ 
profoundly.  
We find only mixed support for horizontal or export platform FDI theories 
(Markusen, 1984). Trade agreements and currency unions do not encourage FDI across 
the board, but only in specific instances (e.g., dollarization and APEC membership). Host 
country market potential is shown to exert a decisive effect on FDI flows, but the effect 
runs counter to the predictions of export platform FDI theory. As in Blonigen et al. 
(2007), we find that a host’s proximity to large markets results in less FDI – as large, 
proximate markets divert FDI from a potential small host, perhaps to take advantage of 
scale economies. Vertical FDI theory (Helpman, 1984) is not strongly supported since 
FDI is sensitive to higher levels of development and, contrary to the knowledge-capital 
model, we find no evidence that educational differences exert robust effects on either the 
intensive or extensive margins. The one exception is that export platform FDI theories, as 
represented by our measure of market potential, no longer receives support from the data 
as an FDI flow or selection determinant. Given the market size of OECD countries we 
thus infer that export platform motivations for FDI are largely driven by differences in 
levels of development, which is not surprising since export platform FDI exploits not 
only the proximity to other large markets, but also the cost advantage of a particular 
producer.   21
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Table 1: Diversity of FDI Determinants and Their Estimated Effects 
(Gravity Approaches Only) 
+n o n e -
DISTANCEij   1 16 natural log of bilateral distance
MRKT_SIZEi 8 2   source natural log of real GDP
MRKT_SIZEi 13 5 2 host natural log of real GDP
BORDERij 2 3   =1 if pair share a common border
COLONYij 4 2   =1 if pair share colonial relationship
COM_LANGij 10 3 =1 if pair share common language
DEVELOPMENTi 3 4   source natural log of real GDP per capita 
DEVELOPMENTj 7 7   host natural log of real GDP per capita
EDU_DIFFij 2 4 2 source minus host education level 
GDP_GROWTHi       source GDP growth rate
GDP_GROWTHj 2 3   host GDP growth rate
MRKT_POTENTIALj 1 1   sum of host’s distance-weighted GDP to all other countries
PRODUCTIVITYj 1 1   host productivity (real GDP per worker)
PRODUCTIVITYi 1 1 1 source productivity (real GDP per worker)
TAXi   1   source corporate effective tax rate
TAXj   3 5 host corporate effective tax rate
RERij   4 2 real exchange rate (host/source currency)




EUij 13  
EFTAij 11  
EEAij     
LAIAij     
APECij 12  
EUROij     
DOLLARij  
BUREAUj 2     host bureaucratic quality
BUREAUi      source  bureaucratic  quality
CORRUPTj 3 2  host  corruption
CORRUPTi      source  corruption
FIN_RISKj 2 2  host  financial  risk
FIN_RISKi 1 2 2 source financial risk
DEMOCRATICj 1     host democratic accountability
DEMOCRATICi      source  democratic  accountability
ETHNIC_TENSIONj  1   host  ethnic  tentions
ETHNIC_TENSIONi      source  ethnic  tentions
EXTERN_CONFLICTj 1     host external conflict
EXTERN_CONFLICTi source external conflict
GOV_STABILITYj 2    host  government  stability
GOV_STABILITYi source government stability
INTERN_CONFLICTj  1   host  internal  conflict
INTERN_CONFLICTi source internal conflict
INV_PROFILEj 2     host investment profile
INV_PROFILEi source investment profile
LAW_ORDERj 2 1   host law and order
LAW_ORDERi       source law and order
MILITARYj   1   host military in politics
MILITARYi source military in politics
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONj   1   host religion in politics
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONi source religion in politics
SOCIO_ECONj  1   host  socioeconomic  conditions
SOCIO_ECONi source socioeconomic conditions




RTAs / CUs 
/ Investment
Gravity














   26
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
(Full Sample) 
  mean sd min max Source
APECij 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 Eicher & Henn (2011)
Bi_RTAij 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 Eicher & Henn (2011)
BORDERij 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 Eicher & Henn (2011)
BUREAUi 3.18 0.95 0.00 4.00 International Country Risk Guide
BUREAUj 3.18 0.95 0.00 4.00 International Country Risk Guide
COLONYij 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 Eicher & Henn (2011)
COM_LANGij 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 RST(2008)
CORRUPTi 4.26 1.31 1.08 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
CORRUPTj 4.25 1.33 1.08 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
DEMOCRATICi 4.98 1.17 1.00 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
DEMOCRATICj 4.96 1.21 1.00 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
DEVELOPMENTi 5.35 1.38 1.71 9.10 constructed from RST(2008)
DEVELOPMENTj 5.32 1.37 1.71 9.10 constructed from RST(2008)
DISTANCEij 8.23 0.93 4.92 9.42 RST(2008)
DOLLARij 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 Eicher & Henn (2011)
EDU_DIFFij 0.01 3.21 -8.50 9.89 RST(2008)
EEAij 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 Eicher & Henn (2011)
EFTAij 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 Eicher & Henn (2011)
ETHNIC_TENSIONi 4.84 1.28 1.00 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
ETHNIC_TENSIONj 4.81 1.33 1.00 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
EUij 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 Eicher & Henn (2011)
EUROij 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 Eicher & Henn (2011)
EXTERN_CONFLICTi 10.90 1.50 4.25 12.00 International Country Risk Guide
EXTERN_CONFLICTj 10.86 1.59 4.25 12.00 International Country Risk Guide
FIN_RISKi 39.95 7.24 18.00 50.00 RST(2008)
FIN_RISKj 39.82 7.38 18.00 50.00 RST(2008)
GDP_GROWTHi 0.04 0.04 -0.13 0.13 constructed from RST(2008)
GDP_GROWTHj 0.04 0.05 -0.13 0.45 constructed from RST(2008)
GOV_STABILITYi 7.61 1.99 1.00 11.00 International Country Risk Guide
GOV_STABILITYj 7.57 2.04 1.00 11.00 International Country Risk Guide
INTERN_CONFLICTi 10.04 2.24 3.00 12.00 International Country Risk Guide
INTERN_CONFLICTj 10.02 2.27 3.00 12.00 International Country Risk Guide
INV_PROFILEi 6.99 1.74 2.33 11.17 International Country Risk Guide
INV_PROFILEj 6.98 1.75 2.42 11.17 International Country Risk Guide
INVEST_TREATYij 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 Neumayer and Spess (2005)
LAIAij 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 Eicher & Henn (2011)
LAW_ORDERi 4.73 1.41 1.00 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
LAW_ORDERj 4.71 1.44 1.00 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
LOGFDI 1.30 2.28 -2.85 11.14 RST(2008)
MILITARYi 4.90 1.44 1.00 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
MILITARYj 4.86 1.52 0.00 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
MRKT_POTENTIALj 0.51 0.21 0.22 1.64 constructed see Blonigen et al., 2007)
MRKT_SIZEi 9.25 1.07 6.85 10.75 RST(2008)
MRKT_SIZEj 9.24 1.10 6.06 10.75 RST(2008)
NAFTAij 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 Eicher & Henn (2011)
NEG_FDI_LAG 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 constructed from RST(2008)*
PRODUCTIVITYi 37.29 17.86 6.48 74.66 RST(2008)
PRODUCTIVITYj 37.23 17.99 4.24 74.66 RST(2008)
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONi 5.18 1.08 1.00 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONj 5.14 1.16 1.00 6.00 International Country Risk Guide
RERij 103.75 31.57 16.73 597.64 USDA http://www.ers.usda.gov
SOCIO_ECONi 6.68 1.66 2.00 11.00 International Country Risk Guide
SOCIO_ECONj 6.68 1.65 2.00 11.00 International Country Risk Guide
TAXi 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.73
TAXj 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.73
1980-92: Altshulter et al. (1998); 1994-02: 
IRS/SOI, World Tax Database  
*This regressor is appropriate in the case where the desired FDI flows were negative  
(as in the case where a foreign subsidiary is liquidated), but reported flows were zero.   27
Table 3 Frequency of Host/Source Observations, By Country 
N obs Obs ≠ 0N o b s O b s  ≠ 0
Argentina 435 132 425 50
Australia 390 214 386 155
Austria 412 133 395 217
Belgium 442 0 442 0
Brazil 326 100 324 45
Canada 405 165 402 161
Chile 424 107 426 22
Colombia 432 67 431 26
Costa Rica 272 1 275 5
Denmark 403 152 410 213
Egypt 131 21 170 9
Finland 406 127 379 231
France 362 315 402 375
Greece 425 123 415 44
Indonesia 128 38 166 18
Ireland 423 172 415 144
Israel 436 77 422 79
Italy 399 231 395 295
Japan 397 180 438 355
Korea 428 193 433 238
Malaysia 354 94 362 53
Mexico 309 193 357 34
Netherlands 401 224 405 314
New Zealand 372 124 387 104
Norway 408 136 400 184
Pakistan 169 28
Panama 407 20 401 17
Philippines 428 111 427 33
Poland 31 20 28 12
Portugal 405 205 416 160
Singapore 288 87 289 66
South Africa 166 52 193 30
Spain 408 280 411 285
Sweden 413 179 364 233
Switzerland 398 157 388 279
Thailand 426 121 426 34
Turkey 397 125 433 64
United Kingdom 409 257 397 341
United States 373 291 392 356
Venezuela 424 77 435 48
Total 14462 5329 14462 5329
FDI Hosts FDI Sources
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Table 4: FDI Determinants, Model Uncertainty, and Model Selection 
Sample
Estimation Method
mean stdev incl prob post mean post stedv mean stdev mean stdev
APECij 0.853*** 0.089 1.00 0.823 0.084 0.815*** 0.088 0.139** 0.071
Bi_RTAij 0.582*** 0.198 0.03 0.009 0.062 0.508*** 0.197 0.480*** 0.135
BORDERij 0.129 0.126 0.00 0.000 0.007 0.212* 0.126 -0.548*** 0.111
BUREAUi 0.239*** 0.077 0.77 0.184 0.120 0.253*** 0.076 -0.0712* 0.043
BUREAUj 0.0360 0.060 0.03 0.003 0.019 0.0394 0.059 -0.0502 0.039
COLONYij 1.153*** 0.111 1.00 1.135 0.110 1.086*** 0.111 0.388*** 0.104
COM_LANGij 0.580*** 0.073 1.00 0.663 0.071 0.547*** 0.073 0.140*** 0.053
CORRUPTi 0.197*** 0.039 1.00 0.218 0.031 0.189*** 0.039 0.0660** 0.027
CORRUPTj 0.104*** 0.037 0.98 0.115 0.035 0.103*** 0.037 0.0375 0.027
DEMOCRATICi 0.0535 0.040 0.01 0.001 0.007 0.0503 0.040 0.0451* 0.025
DEMOCRATICj 0.0751** 0.036 0.00 0.000 0.002 0.0755** 0.036 0.0266 0.025
DEVELOPMENTi 1.012*** 0.028 1.00 1.054 0.026 0.960*** 0.029 0.306*** 0.021
DEVELOPMENTj 0.862*** 0.028 1.00 0.860 0.027 0.810*** 0.029 0.302*** 0.022
DISTANCEij -0.666*** 0.036 1.00 -0.712 0.026 -0.621*** 0.037 -0.190*** 0.029
DOLLARij 4.361*** 0.743 1.00 4.331 0.742 4.497*** 0.735 -0.260 0.365
EDU_DIFFij 0.0179 0.012 0.01 0.000 0.001 0.0196 0.012 -0.00515 0.009
EEAij 0.0431 0.107 0.00 0.000 0.003 0.0129 0.107 0.229** 0.096
EFTAij -0.144 0.179 0.00 0.000 0.008 -0.209 0.179 0.294 0.191
ETHNIC_TENSIONi 0.151*** 0.032 0.97 0.112 0.043 0.139*** 0.032 0.0698*** 0.019
ETHNIC_TENSIONj 0.0184 0.028 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.0180 0.028 0.0355* 0.019
EUij 0.0843 0.094 0.00 0.000 0.003 0.0951 0.094 -0.0303 0.084
EUROij 0.0957 0.180 0.00 0.000 0.010 0.0850 0.179 -0.0322 0.178
EXTERN_CONFLICTi 0.0354 0.027 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.0408 0.026 -0.0287 0.018
EXTERN_CONFLICTj -0.0287 0.025 0.01 0.000 0.005 -0.0313 0.025 0.0160 0.017
FIN_RISKi 0.0107 0.007 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.00864 0.007 0.0131*** 0.005
FIN_RISKj 0.00213 0.006 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.00185 0.006 0.00709 0.004
GDP_GROWTHi 0.332 1.008 0.00 -0.001 0.047 0.309 0.999 -0.0330 0.618
GDP_GROWTHj 3.172*** 0.721 0.99 2.690 0.711 3.055*** 0.716 0.379 0.454
GOV_STABILITYi 0.0408* 0.025 0.01 0.000 0.002 0.0427* 0.025 -0.0107 0.017
GOV_STABILITYj 0.0551** 0.022 0.09 0.003 0.011 0.0517** 0.022 0.00582 0.016
INTERN_CONFLICTi -0.0999*** 0.030 0.48 -0.036 0.041 -0.0920*** 0.030 -0.0350* 0.020
INTERN_CONFLICTj 0.0569** 0.026 0.82 0.065 0.037 0.0536** 0.026 -0.0168 0.018
INV_PROFILEi 0.0162 0.027 1.00 0.095 0.016 0.0186 0.027 -0.0235 0.019
INV_PROFILEj -0.0989*** 0.026 0.00 0.000 0.001 -0.0903*** 0.026 -0.0408** 0.019
INVEST_TREATYij 0.178** 0.084 0.03 0.005 0.031 0.154* 0.083 0.125** 0.055
LAIAij -1.012*** 0.296 0.96 -1.042 0.355 -1.032*** 0.293 -0.240* 0.145
LAW_ORDERi 0.0305 0.047 0.01 0.000 0.005 0.0316 0.047 0.0227 0.028
LAW_ORDERj 0.0809** 0.039 0.49 0.062 0.071 0.0763** 0.039 0.0342 0.028
MILITARYi -0.0412 0.049 0.00 0.000 0.003 -0.0563 0.049 -0.000431 0.028
MILITARYj 0.00244 0.038 0.00 0.000 0.002 0.00321 0.038 0.0165 0.026
MRKT_POTENTIALj -0.479*** 0.131 0.95 -0.443 0.164 -0.494*** 0.130 0.161* 0.093
MRKT_SIZEi 0.425*** 0.094 1.00 0.665 0.081 0.364*** 0.093 0.334*** 0.064
MRKT_SIZEj -1.143*** 0.087 1.00 -1.032 0.078 -1.097*** 0.087 -0.144** 0.062
NAFTAij 0.0881 0.275 0.00 0.000 0.014 0.107 0.273 0.203 0.385
NEG_FDI_LAG -0.228*** 0.071 0.59 -0.126 0.119 -0.296*** 0.072 0.829*** 0.079
PRODUCTIVITYi 0.00979** 0.004 0.04 0.000 0.001 0.00955** 0.004 -0.0106*** 0.003
PRODUCTIVITYj 0.0420*** 0.004 1.00 0.040 0.004 0.0406*** 0.004 -0.00215 0.003
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONi 0.0760* 0.040 0.01 0.000 0.004 0.0639 0.040 -0.0493* 0.026
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONj 0.327*** 0.036 1.00 0.304 0.034 0.306*** 0.036 0.0551** 0.026
RERij -0.00256** 0.001 0.22 -0.001 0.001 -0.00252** 0.001 0.000376 0.001
SOCIO_ECONi 0.0608** 0.026 0.01 0.000 0.003 0.0578** 0.026 0.0616*** 0.017
SOCIO_ECONj 0.0901*** 0.023 0.15 0.007 0.018 0.0904*** 0.023 0.0285* 0.017
TAXi -4.375*** 0.288 1.00 -4.601 0.274 -4.174*** 0.288 -0.731*** 0.199






FDI Flow FDI Flow FDI Flow FDI Selection
Global Global Global Global
OLS BMA Heckit Heckit
14462
20826.04 20587.4 28105.41
5329 5329 5329  
1 BMA statistic is based on best models in the selection stage. ***/**/* indicate 1, 5, 10 percent frequentist 
significance levels. Posterior means are conditional on inclusion.   29



























APECij 1.00 0.761 0.133 0.72 0.159 0.115 1.00 0.985 0.204 1.00 1.330 0.423
COLONYij 1.00 1.074 0.178 0.06 0.016 0.073 1.00 0.839 0.233 0.02 -0.003 0.034
COM_LANGij 1.00 0.642 0.113 1.00 -0.505 0.106 1.00 0.508 0.141 0.01 -0.001 0.010
CORRUPTi 1.00 0.221 0.051 0.00 0.000 0.002 1.00 0.204 0.061 0.03 0.002 0.012
DEVELOPMENTi 1.00 1.016 0.042 0.01 0.000 0.005 1.00 0.953 0.052 1.00 0.360 0.036
DEVELOPMENTj 1.00 0.824 0.044 1.00 0.505 0.099 1.00 0.930 0.055 1.00 0.337 0.036
DISTANCEij 1.00 -0.682 0.043 0.12 0.015 0.044 1.00 -0.744 0.056 0.99 -0.121 0.032
DOLLARij 1.00 4.434 1.194 0.05 0.003 0.012 . . . . . .
MRKT_SIZEi 1.00 0.543 0.124 0.01 0.000 0.004 0.01 0.001 0.022 0.01 0.000 0.013
MRKT_SIZEj 1.00 -1.036 0.124 0.02 0.001 0.005 1.00 -2.047 0.255 0.82 -0.439 0.234
PRODUCTIVITYj 1.00 0.040 0.006 0.01 0.000 0.004 1.00 0.046 0.007 0.25 -0.004 0.008
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONj 1.00 0.284 0.054 1.00 0.249 0.019 1.00 0.294 0.091 0.66 0.123 0.098
TAXi 1.00 -4.462 0.446 1.00 0.244 0.026 1.00 -3.612 0.531 1.00 -2.147 0.329
TAXj 1.00 -4.636 0.435 1.00 -0.201 0.025 1.00 -4.821 0.545 1.00 -2.189 0.336
GDP_GROWTHj 1.00 3.073 1.071 0.00 -0.001 0.030 1.00 7.472 2.230 0.01 0.001 0.123
NEG_FDI_LAG 0.99 -0.296 0.119 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.99 -0.341 0.131 1.00 0.773 0.120
LAIAij 0.98 -1.113 0.490 0.01 0.000 0.008 . . . . . .
INTERN_CONFLICTj 0.98 0.089 0.037 0.02 0.005 0.046 0.01 0.000 0.006 0.01 0.000 0.004
CORRUPTj 0.97 0.121 0.053 0.02 0.001 0.004 1.00 0.249 0.070 0.09 0.009 0.033
INV_PROFILEi 0.96 0.076 0.035 0.10 0.004 0.014 0.04 0.002 0.013 0.02 0.000 0.005
MRKT_POTENTIALj 0.93 -0.433 0.235 0.00 0.000 0.004 0.98 -0.650 0.271 0.01 -0.001 0.022
ETHNIC_TENSIONi 0.92 0.090 0.051 0.00 0.000 0.011 1.00 0.302 0.065 1.00 0.200 0.031
BUREAUi 0.79 0.188 0.140 0.01 0.000 0.001 1.00 1.624 0.162 0.01 0.000 0.011
LAW_ORDERj 0.46 0.052 0.071 0.01 0.000 0.003 0.03 0.003 0.025 0.02 0.001 0.013
RERij 0.19 0.000 0.001 0.08 0.001 0.003 0.01 0.000 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.000
INTERN_CONFLICTi 0.16 -0.010 0.029 0.01 0.000 0.001 1.00 -0.183 0.061 0.01 0.000 0.004
SOCIO_ECONj 0.14 0.006 0.020 0.00 0.001 0.044 0.01 0.000 0.006 0.13 0.011 0.030
PRODUCTIVITYi 0.08 0.001 0.003 0.01 0.003 0.051 0.18 0.002 0.005 1.00 -0.019 0.004
Bi_RTAij 0.06 0.023 0.115 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.19 0.122 0.297 0.10 0.045 0.152
SOCIO_ECONi 0.06 0.004 0.017 0.01 0.000 0.001 0.01 0.000 0.006 0.40 0.035 0.048
GOV_STABILITYj 0.05 0.002 0.011 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.01 0.000 0.006 0.01 0.000 0.003
BUREAUj 0.03 0.003 0.023 0.01 0.000 0.003 1.00 0.878 0.150 0.01 0.001 0.015
DEMOCRATICi 0.03 0.002 0.016 0.01 0.000 0.002 0.01 0.001 0.015 0.09 0.010 0.036
INVEST_TREATYij 0.03 0.004 0.033 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.04 0.015 0.100 0.03 0.008 0.052
MILITARYi 0.02 -0.001 0.013 0.28 0.043 0.073 0.81 -0.215 0.147 0.02 -0.002 0.015
BORDERij 0.02 0.003 0.032 0.01 -0.002 0.024 0.04 0.007 0.050 0.02 -0.004 0.032
INV_PROFILEj 0.02 -0.001 0.007 0.01 0.000 0.003 0.87 -0.080 0.049 0.06 -0.004 0.019
EDU_DIFFij 0.02 0.000 0.003 0.02 0.001 0.006 0.01 0.000 0.002 0.01 0.000 0.001
EXTERN_CONFLICTj 0.02 0.000 0.006 0.00 0.000 0.002 0.21 -0.019 0.044 0.01 0.000 0.004
DEMOCRATICj 0.02 0.001 0.009 0.01 0.000 0.002 0.02 0.002 0.019 0.01 0.000 0.005
GOV_STABILITYi 0.02 0.000 0.006 0.01 0.000 0.009 0.57 -0.050 0.055 0.01 0.000 0.004
FIN_RISKi 0.01 0.000 0.001 1.00 0.409 0.054 0.01 0.000 0.002 0.86 0.026 0.014
LAW_ORDERi 0.01 0.000 0.008 0.13 -0.009 0.025 0.01 0.001 0.014 0.01 0.000 0.006
NAFTAij 0.01 0.003 0.050 0.00 0.001 0.025 . . . . . .
EFTAij 0.01 -0.001 0.028 1.00 0.836 0.078 0.01 0.002 0.033 0.02 0.004 0.040
RELIGIOUS_TENSIONi 0.01 0.000 0.006 0.99 -0.011 0.003 0.01 0.000 0.009 0.01 0.000 0.006
EEAij 0.01 0.000 0.014 0.29 -0.001 0.002 0.43 -0.121 0.169 0.02 0.002 0.023
EUROij 0.01 0.001 0.026 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.01 -0.001 0.026 0.01 -0.001 0.021
FIN_RISKj 0.01 0.000 0.001 0.83 0.058 0.032 0.75 0.022 0.018 0.03 0.000 0.003
GDP_GROWTHi 0.01 0.004 0.145 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.34 1.339 2.255 0.01 0.013 0.183
ETHNIC_TENSIONj 0.01 0.000 0.004 0.68 0.030 0.023 1.00 0.210 0.059 1.00 0.205 0.038
EUij 0.01 0.000 0.010 0.01 0.000 0.002 0.03 -0.003 0.030 0.05 -0.008 0.039
EXTERN_CONFLICTi 0.01 0.000 0.003 0.09 -0.040 0.140 0.11 -0.009 0.033 0.01 0.000 0.004
MILITARYj 0.01 0.000 0.005 0.65 -0.401 0.331 0.02 -0.001 0.015 0.01 0.000 0.006
PAST_FDI_DUM 1.00 2.241 0.038 1.00 2.271 0.063
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1 HeckitBMA statistics are based on best models in the selection and flow equations.  
ª The 95% Credible Interval for the Inverse Mills Ratio does not contain zero. Posterior means 
are conditional on inclusion. 